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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
his own admission of guilt in a subsequent civil action arising out of the same
occurrence? The use of the conviction in the subsequent action is the price
he may have to pay for such convenience.
REVOCATION OF OPERATOR'S L ICENSE

Under the authority vested in him by the New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law Section 71(2)(b), 3 5 the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles revoked respondent's driver's license following a Massachusetts conviction for driving
"under the influence." Since this determination was made without a hearing
it was subject to, judicial review. 36 This review resulted in the trial court
annulling the revocation.3 7 After an Appellate Division affirmance, 38 the Court
of Appeals, in Sullivan v. Kelly,39 unanimously reversed the lower courts, upholding the Commissioner's determination to revoke.
The respondent felt the Commissioner lacked adequate grounds upon
which to revoke the license. The revocation was based upon three documents
before the Commissioner: (1) A copy of the notice of suspension addressed
to the respondent by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles in Massachusetts which
labeled the conviction as one of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; (2) a letter from the Massachusetts Registrar
to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles in New York; and (3) a certified abstract
of the Massachusetts court record which identified the respondent as the party
involved and stated the offense as "operating under the influence."
None of these documents mentioned the Massachusetts statute under
which respondent was convicted. The respondent contended that New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 71 (2) (b) was not operative without identification of the Massachusetts statute. He also contended that the copy of the
court record was the only document which the Commissioner could consider,
claiming that the notice of suspension and the letter from the Massachusetts
Registrar lacked probative value and were unreliable sources for supplying the
essentials required to justify revocation. On the basis of the court record
abstract alone, the offense was labeled as "operating under the influence." This
document, coupled with the absence of the Massachusetts statute, was, the
respondent felt, inconclusive enough to prevent the Commissioner from acting
under Section 71.
To substantiate his position the respondent referred to Moore v. Macduff,40 where only the statute under which the driver was convicted was con35. Now § 510 of the N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law:
...

licenses must be revoked .

.

. where the holder is convicted . . . (of) an

offense consisting of operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor where the conviction was had outside this state; ....
36. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 510(6).
37. Sullivan v. Kelly, 16 Misc. 2d 699, 184 N.YS.2d 310 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
38. 9 A.D.2d 865, 194 N.Y.S.2d 460 (4th Dep't 1959).
39. 7 N.Y.2d 462, 199 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1960).
40. 309 N.Y. 35, 127 NXE.2d 741 (1955).
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sidered in refusing to allow revocation of a license because the statute provided
alternative grounds for conviction, namely, driving while ability was impaired
by "alcohol" or by a "drug." There was no way of determining upon which
alternative the conviction rested.
On the other hand, Bouchard v. Kelly 4 ' upheld a license revocation based
solely upon consideration of a Delaware certificate of conviction.
On the basis of these two cases the respondent felt the Commissioner was
limited to consideration of the court record and the Massachusetts statute
in this instance. He felt the revocation was not valid because the statute was
not present and the court record was inconclusive in that it merely stated the
offense as "operating under the influence."
The Court of Appeals, nevertheless, sustained the Commissioner's license
revocation in this case. The Moore and Bouchard cases were deemed nondeterminative because neither case suggested any necessity for excluding all
documents other than the court record and the statute from consideration.
The Moore case was simply an instance where no other sources were present
to determine which alternative offense had been committed. In the Bouchard
case the certificate itself established the essential information enabling the
Commissioner to employ Section 71. The Court, therefore, did not feel precluded from allowing the Commissioner to consider the suspension notice and
the letter from the Registrar in determining whether there were facts sufficient
to warrant a revocation.
Under the New York Civil Practice Act Section 344-a, the Court found
justification in taking judicial notice of Section 24 of Chapter 90 of the
General Laws of Massachusetts which provides: "Whoever . . . operates a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor shall be punished. .. .". The Commissioner submitted a copy of the information filed in
the Massachusetts court for the first time at trial. The information clearly
charges the motorist with driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor in violation of the General Laws of Massachusetts.
The three documents which were before the Commissioner, plus the
Massachusetts statute which was judicially noticed, undeniably demonstrate
that the respondent deserved to have his license revoked under Section 71.
The result in this particular instance, therefore, was the correct one but the
Court reached it without clearly stating the grounds. Was the revocation
justifiable without consideration of the Massachusetts statute and, if not, how
could the Commissioner's revocation of the license be upheld when he made it
without the statute before him?
Apparently, a non-capricious, non-arbitrary revocation followed by judicial
notice of the foreign statute when the determination is appealed is sufficient
to entitle the State to deprive a person of a vested property right, namely the
possession of his driver's license under Section 71 of the Vehicle and Traffic
41.

7 A.D.2d 774, 27 N.Y.S.2d 963 (3d Dep't 1958),
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Law. 42 In this area, however, where the likelihood of frequent occurrence is
present, it would appear that a more definite statement of the Commissioner's
power to revoke under Section 71 would be beneficial to the public.
EXCEPTION TO RULE MAKING EVIDENCE OF WITNESS'S INVOCATION OF RIGHT

AGAINST SELF-INCRIIINATION INADMISSIBLE
The credibility of a witness may be impeached by proof of prior statements under oath inconsistent with his testimony. 43 Can evidence that the
witness has previously invoked his privilege against self-incrimination be used
to impeach his subsequent non-incriminating testimony on the same matters?"
In People v. Ashby,45 the prosecution was permitted during cross-examination of a key defense witness to show that in his appearance before the Grand
Jury, testifying as to the same matters to which he testified freely and without
incriminating himself at the trial, he had invoked the privilege fifty or sixty
times. 40 The Appellate Division, 47 holding this to be a reversible error of law,48
ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals, while affirming the principle that
a citizen's assertion of his constitutional right to refuse to incriminate himself
cannot subsequently be used to his discredit,49 held that under the special
circumstances of this case the evidence was properly admitted. The defense
had attempted to show that the witness in question had always been ready to
testify fully and completely but that the prosecutor, to thwart a full investigation, had refrained from calling this key witness. The Court held that in
thus raising the issue of the witness's alleged willingness to testify, the defense
had opened the door to full inquiry into the witness's prior refusal to testify in
reliance on his privilege against self-incrimination.
The only New York authority on this point is People v. Luckman,50 a
memorandum decision stating that it was reversible error to permit the prosecution, in cross-examining the witness, to show that she had asserted her
privilege against self-incrimination in testifying before the Grand Jury. The
distinction between this and the present case is both fine and clear. While
such evidence might bear improperly on the credibility of the witness, it is
admissible when directed to the question of the willingness with which he
testified when the issue has been raised by opposing counsel.
The question has been considered more fully by the federal courts. In
Halperin v. United States,5 . the Supreme Court recognized that there is nothing inconsistent with innocence in an assertion of the constitutional privilege
42.
43.
44.

See dissenting opinion, supra note 38.
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 343-a.
U.S. Const. Amend. V; N.Y. Const. Art. I, § 6.

45. 8 N.Y.2d 238, 203 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1960).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

17 Misc. 2d 413, 184 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
9 A.D.2d 464, 195 N.Y.S.2d 301 (3d Dep't 1959).
Citing Halperin v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
Ibid.
254 App. Div. 694, 3 N.Y.S.2d 864 (2d Dep't 1938).
Supra note 48.

